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Abstract
There is “no EPR-like funny business” if (contrary to apparent fact)
our world is as indeterministic as you wish, but is free from the EPR-like
quantum-mechanical phenomena such as is sometimes described in terms
of superluminal causation or correlation between distant events. The the-
ory of branching space-times can be used to sharpen the theoretical di-
chotomy between “EPR-like funny business” and “no EPR-like funny busi-
ness.” Belnap 2002 offered two analyses of the dichotomy, and proved them
equivalent. This essay adds two more, both connected with Reichenbach’s
“principle of the common cause,” the principle that sends us hunting for a
common-causal explanation of distant correlations. The two previous ideas
of funny business and the two ideas introduced in this essay are proved to
be all equivalent, which increases one’s confidence in the stability of (and
helpfulness of) the BST analysis of the dichotomy between EPR-like funny
business and its absence.
1 Background: Two ideas of EPR-like funny busi-
ness
The vast philosophical literature on quantum mechanics is filled with
(a) accounts of EPR-like or Bell-like correlations between space-like related (I
write SLR ) events, and also with
(b) discussions of the same phenomena under the heading of superluminal cau-
sation.
1
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Belnap 2002 used the austere language of branching space-times (BST) in order
to define the following two sharp concepts corresponding respectively to these
rough concepts:
Primary SLR modal-correlation funny business (see Definition 1-2). [1]
Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business (see Definition 1-
3). [2]
That essay then proved the equivalence of [1] and [2], and suggested that this fact
strengthened the case for taking the BST versions as cutting at a joint between
indeterminism on the one hand, and on the other a peculiar feature of quantum
mechanics that goes strangely beyond mere indeterminism.
Also figuring in philosophical discussions of quantum-mechanical funny busi-
ness is the oft-cited common-cause principle of Reichenbach 1956; it seems as if
this plausible principle is violated by the same phenomena that are sometimes de-
scribed in terms of (a) and sometimes in terms of (b). The purpose of this paper
is to state a BST version of the Reichenbach principle, and then prove that its vi-
olation, which we might call “no-common-cause funny business,” is equivalent to
both the existence of primary SLR modal-correlation funny business and to the
existence of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. In fact I describe
two (equivalent) BST versions, which I call more specifically as follows:
No-prior-screener-off funny business (see Definition 3-3). [3]
No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business (see Definition 4-
2). [4]
Thus, to the extent that the two previous ideas [1] and [2] and the two new ideas
[3] and [4] are given modal versions in BST, they come to the same thing.
BST is laid out as an exact theory in Belnap 1992 and again in Belnap 2002,
to which I must refer the reader for notation, postulates and definitions, and above
all for much-needed motivation. Here I list just a few key items as reminders,
including the definitions of [1] and [2].
1-1 DEFINITION. (Key ancillary concepts)
  The primitives of BST are two: Our World, whose members are defined as
point events, and  , the “causal order” on Our World. It is assumed that 
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is a dense strict partial order on Our World with no maximal elements.   is
a point event, and  is a history, i.e., a maximal directed set, where a set is
directed if it contains an upper bound for each pair of its members.  is a
set of histories (also called a proposition) and  is a set of sets of histories
(hence a set of propositions).

is an outcome chain (nonempty and lower bounded chain, where a set is
a chain if each two of its members are comparable by  ); provably  
for some

. It is assumed that

has always a unique infimum 	


, and
it is provable that given    , there is an

such that   

and   = 	


.
An initial event  is a set of point events all of which are members of some
one history, and an outcome event  is a set of outcome chains all of which
overlap some one history.
 
 = 

:  
fiff
, which is the proposition saying that   occurs. ffifl ! = 

:
"

fiff
, which is the proposition that says that  occurs. $#&%(' = 

:
*)
,+
-
.
ff
, which is the proposition that

occurs. 
#&/0'
= 123
#&%('
:

4
ff
+
-
.
,
which is the proposition that says that  occurs.
A proposition  is consistent iff 
+
-
.
. An event of a specified type (   ,

,  , or  ) is consistent iff its listed “occurrence proposition” is consistent.
Use of the notations   ,

,  , and  guarantees consistency. A set of propo-
sitions  is consistent iff 1 
+
-
.
. A set of events of various specified
types is consistent iff the set of their occurrence propositions are consistent.
 
6587

:9
means that
(5
and :9 are undivided at   (   (5;)<:9 , but   is not
maximal therein) and (587  :9 means 65=7  :9 for every  > .
Much-used fact: undividedness-at-   is an equivalence relation on ffi , and
accordingly undividedness-at-  is an equivalence relation on 
fl ?@ 
.
BADCE is a primary propositional spread, that is, an ordered pair of the
initial event  and the partition CF of 
fl ! 
that is induced by undividedness
at  . For 


, CEHG
JI
is the member of CF to which  belongs. When  -
3 
ff
, I write  ADCE and CE8G JI .
  The idea of  ADCF is basic, and I call it a basic primary propositional
spread.1
1There are two ideas: (1) primary propositional spread and (2) basic primary propositional
spread. In Belnap 2002 the terminology for exactly the same pair of ideas was (1) generalized pri-
mary propositional spread and (2) primary propositional spread. I think the change in terminology
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Point events are space-like-related iff they are distinct, not causally ordered
and share a history.  5 SLR  9 means that every point event in  5 is space-
like related to every point event in  9 .
 
65
is separated from  9 at   , written 65 

:9
, >  is maximal in
(5=)<:9
.
65
is separated from  at  , written (5  ; ,  :9 [ :9 E
	:  [  >
and 65 

:9 ]]. When  - 3  ff , I write     , and also use  5    9 when
every history in 
5
is separated at   from every history in  9 .

is relevantly separated from  at  , written     ,      and    [  
>	
65 [ 65 E and  

65 ]].
 is a cause-like locus for  with respect to     ;
#&/0'
.
1-2 DEFINITION. (Primary SLR modal-correlation funny business) Two pri-
mary propositional spreads  5 ADCE and  9 ADCE together with two outcome-
determining histories (5 and :9 such that  5

65
and  9

:9
constitute a case
of primary SLR modal-correlation funny business < 5 SLR  9 and CE G 65 I8)
CE G
:9 I
=
.
.
2
1-3 DEFINITION. (Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.)  ,  , and
 constitute a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business E is
a cause-like locus for  with respect to  , but no member of  lies in the causal
past of any member of  .
It is these last two concepts that Belnap 2002 proves equivalent in the sense that
there exists a case of one iff there exists a case of the other. Let us go on to the
two ideas of funny business introduced above as [3] and [4].
2 Background: Reichenbach’s common cause prin-
ciple
The phrases “common cause” and “screening off” come from Reichenbach 1956.
In the words of Arntzenius 1999, the Reichenbach principle comes to this: “Si-
is a small improvement.
2The adjective “primary” is important. When outcome events are distant from initials as con-
templated in Definition 3-1, then SLR modal correlation is not enough for funny business, since
the correlation can be due to perfectly “ordinary” circumstances such as a “common cause.” That
is what we investigate below. In the primary case, however, there is no “room” for additional
causal “influences” from the past.
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multaneous correlated events have a prior common cause that screens off the cor-
relation.” It seems unrecognized that the idea (but neither the words nor the Re-
ichenbach analysis) of “screening off” and its relation to causality comes first—as
far as amateur research has discovered—from Kendall and Lazarsfeld 1950. It
is restated in Lazarsfeld 1958 in evident independence of Reichenbach, and re-
worked by Lazarsfeld’s Columbia colleague in the textbook Nagel 1961. Here is
a simple abstract example that is a very special case of what they have in mind.
Let A be dichotomous, having just two values A 5 and A 9 , and similarly with B.
Suppose pr(A 5 B 5 ) - 0, and that all other AB combinations have positive proba-
bility. A quick cross-multiplication indicates correlation, since one diagonal of
the AB matrix gives 0 and the other does not. Or, to use another check, we find
that pr(A 5 B 5 ) +- pr(A 5 )   pr(B 5 ). Now introduce C with say three values C 5 , C 9 ,
and C  . Suppose for example that pr(A 5 C 5 ) - 0, pr(B 5 C 9 ) - 0, and pr(A 5 C  ) -
0. Then a consideration of the three “partial” AB matrices for C 5 , C 9 , and C 
shows that the correlation disappears in each case, since all diagonals come out
0. Or, to use another check, we find that the multiplicative relation is restored in
each case; that is, for each i, pr(A 5 B 5 /C  ) is in fact equal to pr(A 5 /C  )   pr(B 5 /C  ).
Thus, the correlation between A and B is “due to” their interactions with C, and is
thus “explained.” C is the “common cause.” Well, as indicated in the Arntzenius
quote, there is in addition a spatio-temporal requirement: Events A and B must be
simultaneous and their common cause C must be prior to each. We ask for a prior
common cause.
It is worth noticing that whereas commentators are generally thoroughly rigor-
ous about the calculus-of-probabilities aspect of the principle, invariably includ-
ing elaborate mathematical calculations, the spatio-temporal aspect is often left to
marginal comment, with no theory offered that could support rigorous deduction.
This is not a new thought; for example, Uffink 1999 urges and makes plain the
necessity of being explicit about the spatio-temporal aspects of the situation: It is
not enough to formulate the principle in the language of the probability calculus:
“Reichenbach’s PCC [principle of common cause] and its variants are crippled
because they lack any explicit reference to space-time structure.” In a nice phrase,
Uffink suggests that “the natural habitat for the PCC is an application for local-
ized events in space-time, rather than in formal phase spaces,” though in a tellingly
honest remark, he also explicitly leaves “aside the question of how to interpret the
required probabilities in this problem.”
Not everyone neglects rigor in treating the spatio-temporal aspects of Reichen-
bach’s principle. Uffink 1999 points out that Penrose and Percival 1962 deals ex-
plicitly with space-time in their formulation of a kind of common-cause principle.
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Letting a, b, and c range respectively over states (they say histories) of 4-regions
A, B, and C, they write
If A and B are two disjoint 4-regions, and C is any 4-region which
divides the union of the pasts of A and B into two parts, one con-
taining A and the other containing B, then A and B are conditionally
independent given c. That is,
p(a&b/c) - p(a/c)   p(b/c) for all a, b (p. 611).
There is, for better or worse, little resemblance between their ideas and those of
BST. For one thing, they work with a single-space time endowed with fixed fields
and particle trajectories; that is, their underlying structure is deterministic. Their
notion of “the probability that region A has history a” comes from counting up
the 4-regions A
 
into which A can be translated, and considering the proportion of
these that have the history a. Although useful epistemologically, this attempt at
a frequentist approach in the context of indeterminism seems to me unacceptable
as an account of objective probability. Nor, as far as I can see, does their account
help with single-case transitional probabilities. (Cartwright 1983 suggests that
“all real probabilities in quantum mechanics are transitional probabilities.”)
Arntzenius 1999 (with reference to Arntzenius 1997) suggests understanding
the principal of the common cause by supposing that “in nature there are transition
chances from values of quantities at earlier times to values of quantities at later
times.” His idea is then to state the following as a common cause principle:
Conditional upon the values of all the quantities upon which the
transition chances to quantities X and Y depend, X and Y will be
probabilistically independent.
The idea of “transition chances” is in the spirit of BST, well worth making rigor-
ous by providing, for example, a theory of “quantities,” of “values of quantities at
times,” and of the “dependence” of one quantity on another.
Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei and Szabo´ 1999 make the distinction between a “com-
mon cause” and a “common common cause,” an idea implicit but not explicit in
Szabo and Belnap 1996. In this essay I am concurring with the opinion that a vi-
olation of a the weaker plain common-cause principle is sufficient and necessary
for no-common-cause funny business. The distinction is made further use of in
Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei and Szabo´ 2000 and Szabo 2000. Re´dei 1996, Re´dei 1997,
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Re´dei 2002 give Reichenbach’s principle an explicit spatio-temporal reading by
reference to relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT). I confess (if that is the right
word) that my training does not fit me to understand RQFT, but one thing seems
clear enough: There is in the cited essays no requirement that the common cause
be prior, something upon which I shall insist. Szabo and Belnap 1996 give a def-
inition of “common cause” in the context of BST theory that puts the common
cause explicitly in the causal past. The actual analysis of the GHZ theorem of that
essay, however, makes no use of this requirement; which is to say, as far as that
analysis goes, the causal-past requirement remains idle.
Another line of research that takes space-time seriously is that founded on
the Kowalski and Placek 1999 analysis of outcomes in branching space-time, in-
cluding Placek 2000a, Placek 2000b, Mu¨ller and Placek 2001, and Mu¨ller 2002,
Placek 2002??. The BST structure of those essays is richer than the BST theory
employed here, explicitly giving a Minkowski structure to each of the branching
space-times. I note that the idea of “outcome” in those papers is a clear-cut and
interesting alternative to the notion of “outcome” that I employ in this essay. The
work of comparing the two analyses has not been done. It needs noting, however,
that Mu¨ller 2002 proves that any BST structure such as is considered here can be
embedded in the richer branching structure that is there defined.
Upshot: There is some work on Reichenbach’s idea that is not fully rigorous
and there is some that is. In both cases the theories contemplated are signifi-
cantly more complicated than the BST theory, employed here, that grows out of
Belnap 1992: The only primitives are the set of point events and a binary causal
ordering upon that set. The postulates governing these primitives are simple; and
everything else is introduced by fully rigorous definition. I am not at all suggest-
ing that simplicity is of itself a virtue (Whitehead: Seek simplicity and distrust
it). I do suggest that the simplicity of BST theory has its place; namely its sim-
plicity helps BST theory in delineating some key structural features of quantum-
mechanical funny business, features that can otherwise become lost by attending
to more complicated structures.
3 From coincidence to no-prior-screener-off funny
business
In common-cause discussions based on Reichenbach’s account, there is generally
talk of a surprising coincidence of kinds of outcomes, for example, everyone at a
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picnic becomes sick, although from an earlier perspective such an outcome was
in each case contingent. Given this coincidence, one looks for a prior event that
“screens off” the coincidence in something like the sense explained in
 
2. (In
the story, the common food of the picnickers is poisoned, whereas from an early
enough vantage point, the introduction of the poison was a contingent matter—the
food might not have been poisoned.) Such a description requires similarity, some-
thing that I try to do without insofar as possible. That is the reason that I structure
the common-cause idea in terms of impossibilities instead of coincidences. First
I give definitions, based on Belnap 2002 and Szabo and Belnap 1996, and then
work out how they apply to the picnic example.
3-1 DEFINITION. (Modal correlation of spreads)
 
BAD
#&/0'
is a propositional transition  for all

4 , 


.
3
 
BAD is a propositional spread  for each ,E there is an  such that
 = #&/0' and BAD#&/0' is a propositional transition and  partitions ffifl ! .
Suppose we have two propositional spreads  5 AD 5 and  9 AD 9 , with  5
and  9 each consistent.
 

5
AD
5
and  9 AD 9 are modally correlated   58)  9 = . for some

5
E
5
and  9 E 9 .
  If we specify both the two propositional spreads  5 AD 5 and  9 AD 9 and
an inconsistent pair of propositional outcomes 
5
E
5
and  9 E 9 (i.e.,

58)

9
-
. ), we say that we have a modal correlation between spreads. If
furthermore every member of  5 is space-like related to every member of  9 ,
then we call it a space-like-related modal correlation between spreads.
  For many purposes it suffices to consider modal correlation as holding be-
tween outcome events instead of between spreads. If ffi#&/ @' and #&/  ' are
individually consistent, but 
#&/ @'
)

#&/  '
-
.
, then we have a modal cor-
relation between outcome events.
The definition of modal correlation between propositional spreads is closely
tied to its probabilistic ancestor. Two “variables” are correlated, according to a
3There is no thought that the transition should be “primary” or immediate. That is the differ-
ence between this set-up and that of Definition 1-2. Observe that each of  and  may be spread
out both time-like and space-like.
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simple concept, when for each of the two variables there is a (separate) probability
distribution for the occurrence of its values, but for some value of the one and
some value of the other, you cannot get the probability of the joint occurrence by
multiplying. A special case of this is when there is a value of the one with positive
probability, and a value of the other also with positive probability, but with zero
probability for their joint occurrence. (You cannot get zero by multiplying two
positive numbers.) That is the probabilistic version of “modal correlation,” with
the following adjustments.
  That the values have positive probability is replaced by saying that each
outcome event, taken individually, is possible or consistent. That a com-
bination has zero probability is replaced by saying that the combination is
impossible or inconsistent. This corresponds to the “special case” indicated
above.
  A much deeper point: I am not speaking of “variables” in some abstract and
perhaps unexplained fashion. Rather, it is spreads—which have concrete
locations on Our World—that play the role of “variables,” and concrete out-
come events that play the role of “values.”
The present concepts must be able to apply to cases such as the poisoned
picnickers. Here is how such an application might go.
EXAMPLE. (The poison case) Pick an early  5 and  9 , respectively in the life of
person 1 and person 2. From these earlier perspectives, it is not settled whether or
not, after the evening meal, person 1 gets sick and similarly for person 2. Let us in-
troduce an outcome event  5  to represent a completely specific “sick” outcome
for person 1, an event that is part of person 1’s later life as sick in that particular
way. Also, let 
5
 represent a completely specific “nonsick” outcome for person
1. Let us symmetrically introduce  9  and  9  as outcome events in two fully
specific possible later lives of person 2, in one of which person 2 becomes sick
and in one of which he doesn’t. Represent the lack of causal influence between
the two persons by choosing  5 and  9 as space-like related.
It is altogether natural to think of the situation in terms of “positive” coinci-
dence: In the circumstances, person 1 gets sick if and only if person 2 gets sick.
But any “iff” story can be told instead in terms of impossibility, and such a telling
gives us more control over the details of the situation. In the present case, the
story is such that in the circumstances it cannot happen that person 1 gets sick
while person 2 doesn’t. (It is a separate fact that it cannot happen that person 2
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gets sick while person 1 doesn’t.) Therefore, as a specific consequence of this,

#&/   '
)

#&/  '
-
.
: There is no history in which both person 1 becomes sick
in the detailed way represented by  5  and person 2 fails to become sick in the
specific way represented by  9  . That is, we have a space-like-related modal
correlation.
I continue the example in order to motivate the BST screening-off version of
Reichenbach’s idea. We have a common-cause explanation for this modal corre-
lation: There is an initial    in the past of both  5  and  9  at which it is not
yet fixed whether or not the food for the evening meal is poisonous. Immediately
after    , however, it is a settled matter whether or not the food is poisonous, and
we can imagine that there are several outcomes of    representing types of poi-
soning and also several representing types of non-poisoning. Gather these into a
set of immediate outcomes of    , so that    ADCE  is a basic primary propositional
spread. When    issues in a poisoning sort of outcome, both person 1 and per-
son 2 become sick. And when    issues in a non-poisoning sort, neither person 1
nor person 2 becomes sick. So each and every immediate outcome C   G JI of   
is either inconsistent with the occurrence of 
5 
or with the occurrence of 
9
 .
The structure of the poisoning spread    ADCE  therefore gives a common-cause
or screening-off explanation of the modal correlation between ffi#&/   ' and #&/  '
with which we started.
In the story, the single basic primary spread   :ADCE  provides a further explana-
tion, namely the same spread that screens off the correlation of ffi#&/   ' and #&/  '
also screens off the correlation between 
#&/  '
and 
#&/   '
. Our story thus con-
tains what Hofer-Szabo´ et al. 1999, as I remarked in
 
2, call a “common common
cause.” Let us, however, concentrate on just the one correlation, that between

#&/   '
and 
#&/  '
. Whence the language of “screening off”? The idea from Laz-
ersfeld on has been that a third variable “explains” a so-called spurious correlation
between two given variables when the correlation disappears for (is screened off
by) each possible value of the third variable, provided the third variable is “ear-
lier” than the others. In BST we can, as before, replace “variable” by “spread,”
and we can in addition give real causal bite to the idea that the explaining variable
should be earlier. In fact, the causal relation of priority plays such a heavy role
that we can for technical purposes of definition simply omit references to modal
correlation of spreads, substituting the much simpler idea of correlation of out-
come events. For the third or “explaining” spread, we invoke only basic primary
propositional spreads. Here is the definition.
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3-2 DEFINITION. (Screening off) Let  5 and  9 be two outcome events, each
individually consistent, that are modally correlated in the sense than 
#&/ @'
)

#&/  '
-
.
. A basic primary spread  ADCF is a prior screener-off 4 of that correlation iff
  Causal priority.     5 for some  5 4 5 and     9 for some  9 4 9 .
  Screening off.   [    	 (either CF=G JI8) #&/  ' - . or CE8G JI=) #&/  ' -
. )]. That is, no matter which immediate outcome of   you consider, that
outcome will be inconsistent with the occurrence of at least one of  5 and

9
.
Comments are in order. First, the version of “causal priority” stated is deliberately
weak. The reason is that by making it weak we make it easier to find a prior
screener-off, so that to say that we cannot find a screener-off that is prior in even
that weak sense is a strong statement of funny business. Second, the modal version
of screening-off is exactly what one is led to if one starts with probabilities. If you
identify impossibility and zero probability, then screening-off here is a special
case of “for each i, pr(A 5 B 5 /C  ) is equal to pr(A 5 /C  )   pr(B 5 /C  )” as discussed in
 
2; namely, both sides evaluate to zero. In other words, the correlation between
the two outcome events 
#&/ @'
and 
#&/  '
is “explained away” by means of their
individual interactions with the causally prior basic primary spread  ADC  . Who
could ask for anything more? We are accordingly led to the following definition,
which is based on Szabo and Belnap 1996 and Belnap 2002.
3-3 DEFINITION. (No prior-screener-off funny business) A pair of outcome
events (nonempty sets of outcome chains)  5 and  9 constitute a case of no-
prior-screener-off funny business 
1. Each of  #&/ @' and #&/  ' is individually consistent; i.e., $#&/ @'
+
-
.
and

#&/  '
+
-
.
. (This is part of the definition of “outcome event.”)
2. #&/ @' is inconsistent with  #&/  ' ; i.e., ( #&/ @' ) #&/  ' ) - . .
3.   :  

5


9 [  5 4 5 and  9 4 9 and     5 and     9 and   [   
	 ( CE8G JI=) 
#&/ @'
-
. ) or ( CE8G JI=) 
#&/  '
-
. )]]. (This is the no-prior-
screener-off condition, with “prior” given its weakest reading.)
4By analogy one should say “prior modal screener-off,” but let us tolerate the potential am-
biguity. One will need the disambiguation, however, in any discussion that includes reference to
probabilistic screening-off.
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4 From prior choice postulate to no-prior-common-
cause-like-locus funny business
“No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business” is the version of “no com-
mon cause funny business” which, although appearing to be more distant from
Reichenbach, arises most naturally from BST. It comes about in this way. The
key “prior choice postulate” of BST theory says that
for any outcome chain

, if

(5
 
:9
, then there is a point event  
in the past of

such that
(5


:9
.
[5]
It is an easy consequence of [5] that
if

is inconsistent with
 (i.e., if  #&%(' )< = . ), then the same prior
point event   will work for any history in which

occurs: :  [    
and    #&%(' ].
[6]
We may use the definition of “cause-like locus” in order to put [6] into something
like an English statement of the prior choice postulate:
If

is inconsistent with

, then there is a point event   such that   is
a cause-like locus for

with respect to

that lies in the causal past
of

.
[7]
Two uses of [7] then yield the following:
If

5
is inconsistent with

9 (i.e., if #&% @' ) #&%  ' - . ), then for any (5 

#&% !'
and any :9 E
#&%  '
,
1. you can find point event   5 in the past of

5
that is cause-like in sepa-
rating
:9
from

5 (   5   5 and :9   3
#&% !'
), and
2. you can also find a point event   9 in the past of

9
that is cause-like in
separating
(5
from

9 (   9   9 and 65   =
#&%  '
).
It is striking, however, that it is not guaranteed by the prior choice postulate that
there is a single point event that will serve simultaneously in both capacities; it
is not guaranteed that there is a single cause-like locus in the common past of

5
and

9
that can serve both to separate

5
from
:9
and

9
from
65
. This failure is
exactly what happens in many cases of EPR-like funny business, an observation I
convert into a definition.
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4-1 DEFINITION. (No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business, simplest
kind) A pair of outcome chains  5 and  9 together with a pair of histories (5
and :9 constitute a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business of
the simplest kind 
1.
65
E
#&% @'
and :9 E
#&%  '
and
2. #&% !'
)
#&%  '
-
.
and
3.   :  [(     5 and :9   
#&% !'
) and (     9 and :9   3
#&%
 
'
].
In BST theory the last clause (3) has two fully equivalent formulations each of
which is somewhat simpler in appearance:
  :  [     5 and     9 and 65 

:9 ]. [8]
  :  [     5 and     9 and 
#&% !'



#&%  '
]. [9]
We might use the term “no-prior-history-splitter funny business” for the principle
that arises by substituting [8] for (3) in Definition 4-1, and “no-prior-outcome-
splitter funny business” for the variant using [9]. Instead, however, I just use
whichever form seems convenient under the one heading, “no-prior-common-
cause-like-locus funny business.” (Observe that since [9] does not mention the
particular histories
(5
and :9 , if we use that variation we could drop (1).)
What is it like when there is a common cause-like locus of the simplest kind?
Given the variant [9], to say that there is no funny business is to say that if you
are in one outcome

5
and consider another outcome

9
that is inconsistent with
yours, then you can find a point event   in the common past of both outcome
events that is a cause-like locus of their inconsistency: $#&% @' 

#&%  ' . In words,
before and at   , both outcome events were possible, but immediately after   , no
matter what happens, at least one of the outcome events becomes impossible.
While the simplest case, especially in the variant with [9], is easiest to un-
derstand, we need a generalization that treats cases in which one or both of the
outcome events are spread out instead of localized in a single outcome chain. The
generalization simply promotes the outcomes from chains to the more general
notion of outcome event, that is, to a set of outcome chains. In stating this gener-
alization, it is technically convenient for us to use an analog to the variant using
[8]
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4-2 DEFINITION. (No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business) A pair of
outcome events (nonempty sets of outcome chains)  5 and  9 together with a
pair of histories
(5
and :9 constitute a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus
funny business 
1. Each of 
#&/ @'
and 
#&/  '
is individually consistent; i.e., 
#&/ @'
+
-
.
and
#&/  '
+
-
. ; and in particular, (5 E#&/  ' and :9 E#&/  ' ,
2. 
#&/ @'
is inconsistent with 
#&/  '
; i.e., ( 
#&/ @'
)

#&/  '
) - . .
3.   :  

5


9 [  5 4 5 and  9 4 9 and     5 and     9 and 65 

:9 ].
Clause (1) picks out two histories for bookkeeping and to witness that each of the
two outcome events is consistent in its own right. Clause (2) simply states that the
outcome events are inconsistent: In no history do all of the “parts” of both begin
to be. Finally, (3) makes the strong claim that the inconsistency between the two
outcome events cannot be localized in a single point event in their common past
in even the weakest possible sense (“weakest” because it is only required that the
point be in the causal past of some part of  5 and also in the causal past of some
part of 
9 ).
5 Equivalence of four ideas of funny business
I have defined four ideas of no funny business: Definition 1-2, Definition 1-3,
Definition 3-3, and Definition 4-2. In spite of rhetorical differences, they come to
the same thing:
5-1 THEOREM. (Equivalence of four ideas of funny business)
PROOF is by way of four lemmas that put them into a circle.
5-2 LEMMA. (Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business implies primary
SLR modal-correlation funny business.) If there is a case of some-cause-like-
locus-not-in-past funny business (Definition 1-3) then there is a case of primary
SLR modal-correlation funny business (Definition 1-2).
PROOF is given as Lemma 2 of Belnap 2002.
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5-3 LEMMA. (Primary SLR modal-correlation funny business implies no-prior-
screener-off funny business) If there is a case of primary SLR modal-correlation
(Definition 1-2) then there is a case of no-prior-screener-off funny business (Def-
inition 3-3).
PROOF. Suppose in accord with Definition 1-2 that there are two primary proposi-
tional spreads  5 ADCE and  9 ADCE together with two outcome-determining his-
tories
65
and :9 such that  5

65
and  9

:9
and  5 SLR  9 and CEG 65I=) CEHG :9 I
-
.
. Define   = 

 :




 and 	






 and 	




> 
ff
,
 
-
. It is
observed in Belnap 2002 that C4G   I - #&/	 ' , so that since  E#&/	 ' ,   -
 ,
each 
#&/	 '
is consistent—and in particular  E
#&/	 '
—whereas 
#&/ @'
)

#&/  '
-
.
. For no-prior-screener-off funny business, we need only suppose that

5
4
5
and

9
4
9
and   

5
and   

9
, and then find a history  such that (z) ( C48G JI
)

#&/ @'
+
-
. ) and ( CE=G JI=) 
#&/  '
+
-
. ). By properties of infima,   	
  5  and
  	


9

, and since the two infima are space-like-related, it must be that   
	


5

and    	


9

. Let

 witness the consistency aspect of the space-
like-relatedness of 	


5

and 	


9

. Then 	


5

certifies that
65=7



and 	


9

that


7

:9
. Now choose

-

 for (z). Evidently (5  ( CE=G   I8)

#&/ @'
) and :9  ( CE8G   I=) 
#&/  '
), finishing the proof.

5-4 LEMMA. (No-prior-screener-off funny business implies no-prior-common-
cause-like-locus funny business) If there is a case of no-prior-screener-off funny
business (Definition 3-3), then there is a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-
locus funny business (Definition 4-2).
PROOF. In effect it suffices to show that each prior common cause-like locus
is itself a prior screener-off. So suppose that
 5
E#&/ @' and :9 E#&/  ' , #&/ @' )

#&/  '
-
.
, and there is a prior common cause-like locus, namely

5
4
5
and

9
4
9
and   

5
and   

9
and 65 

:9
. To show: We also have a prior screener-
off, to wit, 
 [    	 ( CF=G JI=) 
#&/ @'
-
. ) or ( CE8G JI=) 
#&/  '
-
. )]. Suppose for
reductio that CF8G JI=) 
#&/ @'
+
-
.
and CE8G JI=) 
#&/  '
+
-
.
, with
65
witness to the
former and  9 witness to the latter. So (5 7   and 65=7  65 , hence 65=7   by
transitivity of undividedness. Similarly, *7  :9 , :9 7  :9 , and hence *7  :9 .
Therefore
65=7

:9 by yet a further use of the transitivity of undividedness; which
contradicts (5 

:9
and finishes the reductio. 
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5-5 LEMMA. (No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business implies some-
cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business) Whenever there is a case of no-
prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business (Definition 4-2), there is also a
case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business (Definition 1-3).
PROOF. Assume that 
5
and  9 and 65 and :9 constitute a case of no-prior-
common-cause-like-locus funny business (Definition 4-2). Define

5
-
 3 
5
: 

5 [   5   5 and  5 4 5 and  :9 [ :9 E
#&/  '
and 65 
 
:9 ]] ff .
For some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business (Definition 1-3), we show
that (y) 65  8#&/  ' and that (z) no member of  5 is in the past of any member of

9
. The “relevance” part of (y) is built into the definition of  5 , since obviously if
 
5
>
5
then 
:9 [ :9 E#&/  ' and 65 
 
:9 ]. For the splitting part of (y), assume
that
:9
E
#&/  '
. So
:9 
E
#&/ @'
by Definition 4-2(2), which implies that we may
choose

5
such that

5
4
5
and

58)<:9
-
.
. Also Definition 4-2(1) implies that

58)<65
+
-
.
, so that by the prior choice postulate, we may choose   5 such that 65

 
:9
and   5 

5
. Hence  
5
>
5 by the definition of  5 . Since :9 was arbitrary,
we may conclude that (5  3#&/  ' , as required.
Finally we may show (z) by reductio. Suppose for some   5 > 5 and  9 4 9
that  
5


9
. By the definition of  5 , there are

5
4
5
and :9 E
#&/  '
such that
 
5


5
and 65 
 
:9
. Since
:9
E#&/  ' and

9
4
9
,
:9 )

9
+
-
.
. Since
:9
E
#&/  '
by Definition 4-2(1), we have  9 )  9 +- . as well, so that since we are
supposing that  
5


9
,
:9 7
 
:9
. Therefore, by the transitivity of undividedness,
65

 
:9
. This contradicts Definition 4-2(3). 
This completes the circle and the proof of Theorem 5-1. The theorem provides,
in my judgment, additional support for the stability of the BST idea of EPR-like
“funny business,” and for the view that the very austerity of BST theory can be
helpful in articulating what is “funny” about EPR-like quantum-mechanical phe-
nomena.
6 Appendix
This appendix considers some loose ends.
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6.1 Simplest and more general no-prior-common-cause-like-
locus funny business
The existence of the simplest kind of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny
business (Definition 4-1) certainly implies existence of no-prior-common-cause-
like-locus funny business (Definition 4-2) of the more general kind. The question
is, Under what conditions can we have the more general kind of no-prior-common-
cause-like-locus funny business without also having the simplest kind? It appears
that it requires some kind of infinity to distinguish the two. Roughly described
example: Let OW   be a BST structure such that each history is a two-dimensional
Minkowski space-time. Stipulate for OW   an enumerated set of binary choice
points    (so each    has two immediate outcomes, say + and   ). The choice points
   are stipulated as evenly spaced along a hyperplane, so that no single point event
covers (has in its causal past) more than a finite number of    . Let these    be
all the choice points in OW   . They all belong to all of the histories of OW   , and
furthermore, a history of OW   is uniquely determined by specifying one of + or  
for each   . Now define OW 5 by “omitting” the history that is all    +. OW 5 is itself a
BST structure. There is funny business in OW 5 all right, which could be witnessed
by taking a single chain down to   5 + as defining  5 , and taking an infinite set of
chains, one down to each remaining   +, as  9 . Let 65 be some history of OW 5
in which  
5
goes +, and let  9 be the history in which   5 goes minus while all
the other    go +. This combination satisfies the definition of no-prior-common-
cause-like-locus funny business (the generalized form of Definition 4-2).
There is in OW
5
, however, no no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny busi-
ness of the simplest kind (Definition 4-1). This can be seen as follows. Take any
pair of outcome chains

5
and

9
in OW
5
. The outcome chain

5 determines
for each    in its past exactly one of + and   , and ditto for

9
. If these deter-
minations disagree on any    that they both cover, then    serves as a cause-like
locus in the common past of

5
and

9
, so that in this case there is no no-prior-
common-cause-like-locus funny business of the simplest kind. Suppose, however,
that the determinations made by

5
and

9
agree on every    in their common past
(including the case where there are no    in their common past). Then consider
the history defined by agreeing with each    below

5
, and agreeing with each
  below

9 (this is so far a consistent stipulation because of the supposal), and
being all   (i.e., minus) on the remaining   . Both outcome events occur in this
history, and so they are after all consistent, so that Definition 4-2(2) in the defi-
nition of “no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business” is not satisfied. So
you cannot find a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business of the
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simplest kind in this case. The point of the infinity is that you never “need” the all-
   + missing history as a witness to the consistency of any single pair of outcome
chains. In contrast, given a version of OW with only finitely many    , a single
missing history (say, all    +) leads to a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus
funny business of the simplest kind: Take one outcome chain

5
covering exactly
the first  
5
+, and another outcome chain

9
covering exactly the remaining    +.
They are inconsistent, but without a prior common cause-like locus.
6.2 Anomalies
Belnap 2002, note 30, observed that space-like relatedness between two initials

5
and  9 is defined pointwise, so that  5 SLR  9 can hold even when  5 and  9
are inconsistent (no history contains them both). I observed that this is also a
case of primary SLR modal-correlation funny business in the sense of Definition
1-2. Making contact with language of the Bell literature, such a case would have
a causal structure analogous to a case in which you could not simultaneously
initialize to make a certain measurement on the left and a certain measurement
on the right, so that it would be causal-structurally like a failure of “parameter
independence.”
What, in the other two versions of funny business, answers to the inconsis-
tency of 
5
and  9 in the case of primary SLR modal-correlation funny business?
Consider first “some cause-like locus not in the past” funny business in the sense
of Definition 1-3: 


and    #&/0' (which means    #&/0' and    [  > 	

65 [ 65 E
#&/0'
and  

65 ]]) even though no member of  lies in the causal past
of any member of  . It is tempting to say that in this case “before”  both  and
 are possible, but “after”  at least one of  and  becomes “henceforth” im-
possible. But this language presumes that 
fl ! 
)

#&/0'
+
-
.
, which does not follow.
The example that comes to mind is infinite, namely, that described in Figure 4 of
Belnap 2002. The only history of which 
5
is a subset is   , which makes 
fl ! 
in-
consistent with

9
. Probably any counterexample has to be infinite. At the same
time it seems as if one finds an example of two initials that, while inconsistent
with each other, are nevertheless part of a primary SLR modal correlation, then
the example has to be doubly infinite, so that, say, each initial determines its own
unique history.
When, however, 
fl ! 
)

#&/0'
+
-
.
, the tempting language seems acceptable,
where we unpack the “before” possibility merely as the compossibility of each
of

and  with 
fl ! 
. The “after” impossibility means simply that no immediate
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outcome of  (no member of CF ) is consistent with both  and the occurrence of
 .
Passing now to the third and fourth of the BST versions of funny business,
what about no-prior-screener-off funny business (Definition 3-3) and no-prior-
common-cause-like-locus funny business (Definition 4-2)? As far as I can see,
these formulations do not permit the isolation of any special cases. It seems that
special cases are generated only by those formulations of funny business in which
initials explicitly figure.
6.3 Reduction of relevant splitting
In the presence of no funny business, the need for and the complications of the
definition of    #&/0' disappear. Let NFB be an acronym for “no funny busi-
ness.” Then we have the following.
6-1 FACT. (Reduction of “relevant splitting”) Under the hypothesis of no funny
business, the entire “action” of an initial  with respect to a history J5 and an
outcome event  can be concentrated in some single point event in  . That is,
NFB and 65  ;#&/0' together imply :  [  > and (5   #&/0' ].
PROOF. Suppose NFB and (5   
#&/0'
. By NFB (in the form that says that for
every cause-like locus for  with respect to
 5
, some part of  lies in the past of
some part of  ), choose  > and  4 such that     . We show that  5  

#&/0'
. To this end, let  9 E
#&/0'
; it suffices to show that
(5


:9
. By relevance,
choose
:9
E#&/0' such that
65


:9
.
:9
E#&%(' and :9 E#&%(' by the definition
of #&/0' , so
:9 7

:9 by these two plus the fact that   

. Hence,
 5


:9 by the
transitivity of undividedness. Hence  5   
#&/0'
as required. 
6.4 Generalization to three or more outcome events?
It is noteworthy that the no-prior-splitter version of funny business does not,
whereas the no-prior-screener-off version does seem to suggest a natural gener-
alization to cases of three or more outcome events. But this is more appearance
than reality. One should take into account the Uffink 1999 consideration of the
problem of saying something common-cause-like in the case of three events each
pair of which are independent. The translation into modal terms in BST seems to
be as follows.
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There are three outcome events such that each pair is consistent, but not all
three taken together. Say
(5
 ( 
#&/  '
)

#&/  '
), :9  ( 
#&/  '
)

#&/

'
), and  
 ( #&/  ' ) #&/  ' ), whereas (  #&/ @' ) #&/  ' ) #&/  ' ) - . .
In this case, what would count as a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus
funny business? First reformulate in binary terms, since  5   9 is itself an out-
come event and since (  #&/ @' ) #&/  ' ) - #&/ 3/  ' . So there are three threats of bi-
nary no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business. To avoid the threat, there
must in each case be an appropriate common cause. Thus, to escape three-termed
funny business, each of the following must hold.
1. :  

5


9 [ 65 

:9
and

5
 (  5   9 ) and  9    and     5 and   

9 ].
2. :  

5


9 [ 65 


 and

5
 (  5    ) and  9   9 and     5 and   

9 ].
3. :  

5


9 [ :9 


 and

5
 (  9    ) and  9   5 and     5 and   

9 ].
There seems to be no reason for supposing that the witnesses to (1)–(3) must
overlap. If they did, that would presumably count as a “common common cause.”
So this is a reflection that coheres with the results of Szabo, Redei, et al. that
the existence of common causes does not by any means imply the existence of
common common causes, neither in detail nor in spirit.
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